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1   Introduction 
Saenuri Party candidate Park Geun-hye was elected the president of South Korea with 
51.6% of the vote in the 18th presidential election on December 19, 2012. It was a very close 
match between Park and Moon Jae-in, the Democratic Party candidate, until the day of the 
election, but the result was Park’s victory by a relatively wide margin of more than 1 million 
votes. Park was successful in her second attempt at a presidential election, after losing the 
2007 presidential candidate election to her rival, Lee Myung-bak, who became South Korea’s 
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On February 25, 2013, the new President Park Geun-hye was appointed as the first 
female leader of South Korea amid high expectations of the people and daunting na-
tional and international challenges. This paper has two main purposes. First, it looks 
at the overall vision and policy direction of the newly launched Park administration. 
Second, more specifically, it analyzes the major direction of the Park administration’s 
foreign and security policy, and discusses the major issues of South Korean foreign 
policy toward East Asian countries. The first part of this paper analyzes the charac-
teristics of the Park administration and the main direction of its government and for-
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personal philosophy and leadership style, the ruling party’s ideological orientation and 
policy preferences, and the president’s inaugural speech and Transition Committee’s 
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of the Park administration’s East Asia diplomacy. The first issue is how to deal with 
North Korea’s nuclear threats and to establish a trust-building process. Secondly, this 
paper examines South Korea’s dilemma due to the pivot to Asia policy of the U.S. 
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17th president. On February 25, 2013, Park was appointed president, and launched her new 
government amid high expectations of the South Korean people and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, difficult national and international challenges, such as recovery from the economic 
downturn caused by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, persuasive calls for a resolution 
of economic polarization in the country, expansion of South Korea’s welfare system, a nuclear 
deterrent to North Korea, improvement of inter-Korean relations, and normalization of the 
long-standing political conflict with the North. What kind of leadership President Park will 
show and which governmental vision and policies she will adopt to solve these challenges 
have been drawing a lot of attention in the Korean media and among citizens and interna-
tional observers.
The current Park administration is expected to show a significant difference in policy line 
from the former Lee administration. President Park proposed a progressive pledge of welfare 
expansion and so-called economic democratization1 during the election campaign, which was 
uncharacteristic of a conservative candidate. She also has presented policies different from 
the former Lee administration’s so-called “North Korea policy in principle,” such as a policy 
to improve inter-Korean relations through “the Korean Peninsula Trust Process.”2 Whether the 
Park administration’s breakthrough policy commitments, promised during her presidential 
election campaign, will actually be executed as policy is still a question. Furthermore, in the 
case of the Park administration’s revised policies on North Korea, whether the intended re-
sults of these policies will be fulfilled is a matter of great interest and speculation among ex-
perts and non-experts alike.
Against this backdrop, this paper has two purposes. First, it will look at the overall vision 
and policy direction of the newly launched Park administration. Second, more specifically, it 
will analyze the major direction of the Park administration’s foreign and security policy, and 
discuss the major issues of South Korean foreign policy toward East Asian countries. In order 
to accurately and fairly analyze the characteristics of the Park administration and the main 
direction of its government and foreign and security policy, this paper will focus on the fol-
lowing three factors.
First, this paper will examine President Park’s personal philosophy and leadership style. In 
South Korea, a country that has adopted a centralized presidential system, the characteristics 
and state administration of a particular government are considerably affected by the philoso-
phy and leadership style of the leader. Therefore, this paper will examine Park’s personality 
and leadership style as well as her family history.
Second, in order to understand the governing philosophy and policy direction of the new 
government, it is necessary to understand the ruling party’s ideological orientation and policy 
1 The term “economic democratization” was popularized in South Korea in particular during the 2012 presidential 
candidates’ elections; however, the term itself has no clear definition. The legal basis for the concept was stipulated 
in the Constitution upon its revision in 1987. “The state must regulate and coordinate economic affairs in order to 
maintain the balanced growth and stability of the national economy, to ensure proper distribution of income, to pre-
vent the domination of the market and the abuse of economic power and to democratize the economy through har-
mony among the economic agents,” reads item 2 of Article 119 of the Constitution. However, there have been con-
troversies on exact meaning of “economic democratization.”
2 Despite negative public opinion regarding the former Lee Myung-bak administration, candidate Park Geun-hye from 
the same political party was elected president. It is mainly because President Park succeeded in differentiating her-
self from and keeping a distance from the Lee administration during the election campaign.
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preferences. Although the individual quality and image of a presidential candidate play a con-
siderable role during an election campaign, it is clear that the policy direction and main poli-
cy contents of the party with which a candidate is affiliated, as well as the approval ratings 
of the candidate’s party, have a significant influence on the result. In addition, since the pro-
cess of presidential policy implementation require the cooperation and support of the ruling 
party, the policy line and policy preferences of the ruling party have a significant impact on 
statecraft.3
Third, probably the most crucial task in identifying the governing philosophy and major 
policies of a new administration is to review the president’s inaugural speech and key policy 
documents. In particular, I will analyze the vision and core policy goals by reviewing a docu-
ment named “Park Geun-hye Administration’s National Issues,” which was a collection of 
presidential policy pledges and was produced by Park’s Presidential Transition Committee.
2   Park Geun-hye Administration’s Characteristics, Vision, and Goals
2.1   President Park Guen-hye’s Personal Background and Leadership Style
In addition to being the first female president in the constitutional history of South Korea, 
President Park Geun-hye is a leader with a unique family history. She is the eldest daughter 
of former South Korean President Park Chung-hee, and she lived a life full of ups and 
downs.4 In 1952, Park Geun-hye was born in Daegu as the first daughter of three children （a 
son and two daughters） of former President Park Chung-hee. She was raised at the presiden-
tial Blue House since former President Park Chung-hee took office in 1963. In 1970, she en-
rolled at Sogang University and majored in electrical engineering. She played the role of First 
Lady on behalf of her deceased mother, Yook Young-soo, who was assassinated at the Na-
tional Liberation Day ceremony in 1974. After another tragedy in which her father, former 
President Park Chung-hee, was murdered by his aide, CIA director Kim Jae-gyu, on October 
26, 1979, she left the Blue House and served as the chairman of the Chungsoo Scholarship 
Committee and the Yookyoung Foundation, which was founded for youth education by her 
deceased mother in 1969. In 1998, she entered the political arena and was elected a member 
of the National Assembly in the by-election in April. Since then she has been elected mem-
ber of the National Assembly five times in a row. After serving as the vice-president and 
chief representative of the Hannara Party, which preceded the currently-ruling Saenuri Party, 
she ran for the position of ruling candidate for the presidential election of South Korea in 
2007; however, she lost that primary election to former South Korean President Lee Myung-
bak. Five years later, Park was elected the Saenuri Party’s presidential candidate and then 
earned a victory in the 18th presidential election. She became the first female president of 
South Korea.
3 Lee Sook-jong and Kang Won-taek. eds. 2013 Daetongryung’sSungkongJokeon ［2013 The Condition of President’s 
Success］ （East Asia Institute, 2013）.
4 For the personal history and political life of President Park Guen-hye, refer to the following: 
Park Guen-hye, Despair Trains Me and Hope Moves Me （Wisdom House, 2007） （in Korean） ; Kim Byung-wan, 
Park Geun-hye’s Life （Moonhak Sketch, 2012） （in Korean）. 
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President Park Geun-hye’s political vision and leadership style seem to be considerably af-
fected by her father. In her inaugural speech, for example, President Park announced her am-
bition to begin a new era on the basis of the modernization achieved by her father. One of 
the reasons that President Park Geun-hye has been able to maintain high public popularity 
since she entered politics in 1988 and returned to the Blue House after 34 years was that 
nostalgia for the former President Park Chung-hee and his policies remains strong among the 
South Korean people.According to many opinion surveys, Park Chung-hee is regarded as the 
most respected President by the Korean public. This nostalgia likely acted as an important 
political asset to President Park Geun-hye. At the same time, however, her father is also a 
political burden to overcome for President Park Geun-hye. Since the evaluation of former 
President Park Chung-hee is clearly divided in South Korea, it would be difficult for Presi-
dent Park Geun-hye to impress people as a leader of a new era if she fails to escape from the 
shadow of former President Park Chung-hee.
Although President Park Geun-hye has maintained an ideologically conservative stance 
since she entered politics, she has most recently proposed liberal economic and welfare poli-
cies, and moderate foreign and security policies. Furthermore, President Park has shown a 
distinctive leadership style. She has played an active role as a leader of the ruling party, 
which maintains high popularity and a solid base of support; however, she has been very in-
fluential behind the scenes without always being in the limelight. While Park has engendered 
a positive political image of emphasizing principles and keeping promises, her stubbornness 
and lack of flexibility have been criticized in the media and among the public. In addition, 
she has been criticized as clumsy in communications with other politicians as well as with 
the general public, and she has been accused of lacking a democratic leadership style. In par-
ticular, concern has been raised often that her attitude downplays communication and negoti-
ation with her opposition. 
2.2   Policy Line and Policy Preferences of the Ruling Party
The policy line and policy preferences of the ruling party have a significant impact on the 
new administration because cooperation and support of the ruling party are required for suc-
cessful presidential leadership. In fact, many lawmakers of the Saenuri Party have been ap-
pointed to the ministries, Chief Presidential Secretary office, and other key offices of the Park 
administration. When President Park entered politics as a lawmaker of the Hannara Party, 
the predecessor of the Saenuri Party, she established the foundation of popularity that led to 
her being elected first as leader of the Saenuri Party and then as national president under the 
Saenuri Party’s organization and policy line. The Saenuri Party has its roots in the Gongwha 
Party, established long ago by Park’s father, former President Park Chung-hee, and in the lat-
er Minja Party, which was backed by authoritarian military force. The decades-old Park re-
gime and its conservative ideology have been maintained in the Saenuri Party.5
5 The name change from Hanara to Saenuri has been considered part of an effort to reform the negative image of 
the previous Hanara Party. But there obviously has been an attempt, as well, to change the party’s policy line and 
direction, with many experts suggesting that the Saenuri Party’s policies are much more middle-of-road than those 
of its predecessor parties. Nonetheless, in the ideological spectrum of Korean political parties, likely no one will 
deny that the Saenuri Party still has a conservative orientation.
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According to a survey on the ideologies of the members of the 19th National Assembly 
conducted by the Korean Association of Party Studies and JoongAng Daily newspaper, as 
shown in Table 1, the mean value of the Saenuri Party lawmakers’subjective ideology was 
6.21, which clearly showed their conservative orientation compared to the Democratic United 
Party （2.91） and United Progressive Party （1.62）. In addition, as shownin Table 2, this ide-
ological difference consistently has appeared to influence economic, national security, social 
welfare, and post-materialism values and policies.6 Furthermore, the Saenuri Party holds re-
gional supremacy in the southwestern Yeongnam region, in which its stable base of support 
has been maintained, and the party has received overwhelming support from voters in their 
50’s and 60’s in recent elections. It also has a solid base of support from large companies and 
members of the upper-middle and upper classes.
Table 1 Mean Ideological Score of the 19th National Assembly Members by Party
Party Affiliation Mean Ideology Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Saenuri 6.21 1.31 3 10
Democratic United 2.91 0.92 1  5
United Progressive 1.62 0.96 0  3
0 ＝ Most Progressive, 5 ＝ Moderate, 10 ＝ Most Conservative
Reference: Kang Won-taek, “Ideological tendencies and policy attitudes of the members of the 19th National Assembly,” 
Conference Proceedings of the Korean Association of Party Studies—Election Ratings, May 4, 2012.
Table 2 Mean Ideological Score of the 19th National Assembly Members by Policy Areas
Party Affiliation Foreign & Security/Anti-Communism Economy Social Welfare
Post-materialism 
Values
Saenuri 6.11
（1.06）
4.41
（1.34）
6.49
（1.42）
4.80
（0.92）
Democratic United 2.21
（0.79）
2.13
（0.89）
1.74
（1.30）
3.46
（0.71）
United Progressive 0.41
（0.51）
0.92
（0.88）
0.15
（0.29）
2.31
（0.97）
Analysis of Variance F＝576.0
p＜0.01
F＝132.3
p＜0.01
F＝397.3
p＜0.01
F＝97.9
p＜0.01
（   ） Standard Deviation
0-Most Progressive, 5-Moderate, 10-Most Conservative
Reference: Kang Won-taek, “Ideological tendencies and policy attitudes of the members of the 19th National Assembly,”
Conference Proceedings of the Korean Association of Party Studies, May 4, 2012.
6 Kang Won-taek, “Ideological tendencies and policy attitudes of the members of the 19th National Assembly,” Con-
ference Proceedings of the Korean Association of Party Studies, May 4, 2012.
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2.3   Governmental Vision and Five Goals of the Park Geun-hye Administration 
2.3.1   Governmental Vision
According to her inauguration speech and the report by Presidential Transition Committee, 
the Park Geun-hye administration’s governmental vision is “a new era of people’s happiness 
and hope.”7 In her inauguration speech on February 21 last year, President Park suggested 
that “the size of each person’s happiness will become the size of national power, and all peo-
ple will enjoy the national power” as a new era of hope for South Korea.8 This governmental 
vision has been evaluated by various experts as a new governmental paradigm.  A lot of aver-
age Koreans have voiced pessimism and even complaints about their livelihood and future. 
Also, many citizens hold a clear distrust of the government and its leaders. In fact, almost no 
experts would deny that there is growing anxiety among the public regarding their future and 
that of their children, regardless of the fact that South Korea’s international status has risen 
and South Korea has reached the threshold of developed countries in terms of economic 
prosperity. The Park administration’s governmental vision seems to show Park’s desire to 
overcome the pessimism expressed by the majority, as well as her administration’s intention 
to create policies that increase people’s happiness and inspire their hope for a brighter future.
2.3.2   Five Governmental Goals
In order to achieve itsproposed governmental vision, the Park administration has suggested 
the following five key governmental goals.9 They seem to be closely related to the economic, 
social, and security challenges that South Korea is facing.
2.3.2.1   Creative Economy Centered on Job Growth
The Park administration aims for an economic revival through the rise of creative indus-
tries that fuse technology and manufacturing, as well as culture and manufacturing, and that 
break down the walls between industries. Park described the goal of the economy as a cre-
ative one, one that creates new markets and jobs through the fusion of more traditional in-
dustries, instead of simply expanding existing industries and markets. In her speech, Presi-
dent Park clarified her understanding of “economic democratization,” saying that such a 
reality should be achieved in order to make the so-called “creative economy” flourish. Presi-
dent Part expressed a hope that her policies may achieve a new “Miracle on the Han River,” 
a catchphrase popularized during her father’s era. She explained that her vision of a new era 
begins with the establishment of fair markets and the promotion of small business develop-
ment. 
2.3.2.2   Tailored Employment and Welfare
President Park expressed many of her initiatives for job creation and tailored welfare dur-
7 The 18th Presidential Transition Committee,“ParkGeun-hyeJeongbuwiGukjungGwaje,” ［The Park Geun-hye Admin-
istration’s National Issues］, February 2013. www.region.co.kr/news. 
8 “Inaugural Speech of President Park Geun-hye,” Korea Herald, February 25, 2013.
9 The 18th Presidential Transition Committee,“Park Geun-hyeJeongbuwiGukjungGwaje,” ［The Park Geun-hye Admin-
istration’s National Issues］, February 2013. www.region.co.kr/news. 
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ing her presidential campaign. With a lowered national growth rate and an increased unem-
ployment rate, job creation was found to be the most critical policy challenge that people an-
ticipated for the new government, according to various polls.10 In addition, with the fast-
paced economic polarization of South Korean society, the gap between the rich and the poor 
has gotten significantly bigger, and the demand for economic welfare has increased. Figure 1 
summarizes the results of a public opinion poll on governmental policy conducted by the East 
Asia Institute on January 5, 2013. Job creation （31.3%）, resolving polarization （19.9%）, and 
economic growth （14.4%） were found to be the top priority policies. Early in its term, the 
Park administration suggested a goal of creating a society to advance people’s happiness and 
hope by promoting a tailored new employment and welfare paradigm.
2.3.2.3   Creative Education and Life Rich in Culture
In her inauguration speech, President Park emphasized the need for a new educational 
system, saying that fulfilling one’s dreams and beginning a new era of national hope begins 
with proper education, and that active educational support develops the potential of individu-
als, thus further developing a nation based on its citizens’ enhanced abilities. Park also 
showed her desire to instill the value of culture throughout society, and emphasized that the 
economy is vitalized and new jobs are created when creative activities in various genres are 
supported. In particular, she drew attention to creative content industries, which, she said, are 
a fusion of culture and high technology, and which would be promoted by her government.11
10 Job creation is considered the top priority policy that people expect from the new government,according to a vari-
ety of polls. Refer to East Asia Institute, Panel Survey on 2012 18th Presidential Election, December 23, 2012. Refer 
to http://www. eai.or.kr.
11 “Inaugural Speech of President Park Geun-hye,” Korea Herald, February 25, 2013.
Figure 1 Top Priority of Government Policies
Job Creation
Resolving Economic Polarization
Economic Growth
Education
Low Fertility & Aging Society
Housing
Political Reform
31.3%
19.9%
14.4%
6.3%
5.9%
4.8%
4.1%
35.0%30.0%25.0%20.0%15.0%10.0%5.0%0.0%
Reference: East Asia Institute, Panel Survey on 2012 18th Presidential Election, December 23, 2012.
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2.3.2.4   Safe and Cohesive Society
President Park declared in her inaugural speech that the government would stay focused 
on creating a safe society, recognizing safety as an essential requirement of people’s happi-
ness. In addition, she promised to create a society where fairness and justice of the law is re-
alized and in which fairness and justice of the law becomes a righteous shield of protection 
for the underprivileged. She further stated that the government would have a major goal of 
alleviating social conflicts and integrating South Korean society, which had been fractured by 
conflict and confrontation due to regional, generational, and ideological differences.
2.3.2.5   Laying the Foundation for National Reunification
President Park presented her administration’s goal for foreign and security affairs. Presi-
dent Park’s will, she said, was to lay a foundation for national reunification, which would be 
an historical achievement. She said she would accomplish this by improving inter-Korean re-
lations and achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, she suggested 
an expansion of “trust diplomacy” for neighboring countries, explaining that she would 
strengthen Korea’s relationship with countries in the Asia and Oceania regions, in particular 
the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, in order to mitigate tension and conflicts, and to spread 
peace and cooperation throughout Asia. In a closely-related note, Park highlighted the impor-
tance of global diplomacy.
3   The Park Geun-hye Administration’s Foreign and Security Policies
As discussed earlier, the Park administration’s goal for its foreign and security affairs has 
been to lay a foundation for national reunification. In order to achieve this goal, the Korean 
Peninsula Trust Process was outlined as a main policy for improving inter-Korean relations 
and for accomplishing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, the Park ad-
ministration clearly recognized that the foundation of peace on the Korean peninsula and the 
possibility of reunification of the two Koreas require not only an improvement of inter-Korean 
relations but also the stability of Northeast Asia and the cooperation and support of major 
countries in the region. For many years prior to her election as president, President Park em-
phasized linkage among North Korean issues, peace on the Korean peninsula, and Northeast 
Asian security. Thus, it was not surprising that the Park administration presented its goal of 
achieving peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia, especially 
through an expansion of “trust diplomacy” for neighboring countries. In order to accomplish 
this goal, the Presidential Transition Committee suggested the following three specific goals.12
3.1   Strong Security and Sustainable Peace
The international community has intensified sanctions on North Korea in recent years be-
cause North Korea has conducted nuclear tests and missile development despite the interna-
12 18th Presidential Transition Committee, “The Park Geun-hye administration’s national issues.”
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tional community’s repeated warnings. North Korea’s resistance to these sanctions and poli-
cies increased instability and threatened security on the Korean peninsula. Considering that a 
third nuclear test was conducted around the launch of the new government, the Park admin-
istration was almost forced to set its first foreign and security goal of achieving sustainable 
peace on the Korean peninsula based on strong security. In order to achieve this goal, four 
major tasks were suggested.
The first task is to strengthen defense capabilities and ensure that South Korea can effec-
tively deter and actively respond to North Korean provocations. More specifically, the plan 
has included securing a strong defense capability through an active deterrence strategy, en-
hancing anti-terrorism capability, and strengthening reaction capabilities to cyber warfare. The 
second task is to fortify future-oriented defense capabilities that correspond to changes in the 
security environment. For this purpose, defense reform, such as development of new military 
strategy and wartime operation control （OPCON） transfer, will be promoted urgently. It in-
cludes a plan to develop the South Korean missile defense system for effective defense 
against the North Korean missile threat and to strengthen the tailored and extended deter-
rence capacity for effective reaction to the North Korean nuclear threat.
The third task is to enhance defense cooperation with neighboring countries and continu-
ously develop the Korea-U.S. military alliance. This involves the development of the Korea-U.
S. Alliance Defense Vision 2030 and the expansion of the Korea-U.S. regular consultative
body into a new “2+2” system. The fourth task is to take a leading role in a multilateral secu-
rity framework in the region. The Park administration has made it clear that denuclearization
of North Korea will be sought through policy coordination with the countries of the “six-party
talks,” that were created under the former Roh Moo-hyun administration in response to North
Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. An effective sanction on North
Korea would be achieved by working closely with the international community, according to
Park. In particular, it is believed that by progressively operating three-party strategic talks
among Korea, the U.S., and China, and by building three-party trust, the North Korean nucle-
ar issue can be resolved.
3.2   Implementing Reunification on the Korean Peninsula
The Park administration’s second set of foreign policy goals are aimed at realizing a new 
Korean peninsula on which reunification may be achieved in a “happy” way. The core policy 
for this goal is the normalization of inter-Korean relations through the Korean Peninsula Trust 
Process, as previously mentioned in this paper. The Korean Peninsula Trust Process is a set 
of North Korea policies and initiatives that President Park and her national security staff have 
contemplated for a long time. In fact, President Park published her account of the Korean 
Peninsula Trust Process in the autumn 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs, a global professional 
journal in the field of foreign affairs.13 The Korean Peninsula Trust Process policy emerged 
mostly because of the evaluation that distrust between the two Koreas had deepened during 
13 Park Geun-hye, “A new kind of Korea: Building trust between Seoul and Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 
2011.
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the Lee administration due to discontinued communication and breached agreements. Al-
though the Lee administration’s North Korean policy linked large-scale economic assistance 
to the denuclearization of North Korea, the denuclearization of North Korea did not occur 
and South-North relations became strained. The Korean Peninsula Trust Process is a prospec-
tive North Korea policy based on the logic that humanitarian assistance and economic ex-
change result in increased trust, and that such trust can lead to the denuclearization of North 
Korea.14
However, President Park has made it clear that the Korean Peninsula Trust Process is not 
a simple appeasement policy but a North Korea policy based on strong deterrence. In other 
words, it is a strategy to reinforce deterrence of North Korean provocations and threats, 
which were heightened with North Korea’s third nuclear test, which occurred on February 
12, 2013. Just as important, it is a strategy to realize sustainable peace on the Korean Penin-
sula through the formation of South-North trust and the normalization of inter-Korean rela-
tions in the long-term. To do this, considering the international circumstances and North Ko-
rea’s attitude, the inter-Korean communication channel that became deadlocked under the 
Lee administration would be reactivated under Park’s rule, and the principles inherent in the 
existing inter-Korean agreements would be adhered to.
In addition, President Park expressed her willingness to carry forward pure humanitarian 
support for North Korea, separately from the political and security situation, after consulting 
with international organizations. The Vision Korea Project was created by the Park adminis-
tration to build an economic community between the two Koreas based on the inter-Korean 
trust-building process previously explained and the denuclearization progress. The Vision Ko-
rea Project is meant to achieve an economic community gradually by installing industrial in-
frastructure, such as railways, roads, power lines, and communications systems, in both South 
and North Korea. In addition, it includes joint research on environmental issues, including 
economic cooperation to ensure environmental sustainability, border area environmental man-
agement, and a plan to construct a South-North environmental community, such as a new re-
newable energy zone within the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, an industrial park just north 
of the Demilitarized Zone in North Korea in which South Korean companies employ North 
Korean workers to manufacture goods.
Finally, a strategy to reinforce practical capability and favorable public opinion regarding 
reunification has been proposed by the Park administration. Its specific goal is to build na-
tional consensus by mitigating conflict and confrontation related to reunification and South 
Korea’s North Korea policy, and by securing the support of the international community for 
reunification. 
3.3   Developing Trust Diplomacy along with the People
The third specific goal of the Park administration’s foreign and security policy is to imple-
ment the administration’s “trust diplomacy” along with the people, as it is a core value of 
14 Park In-hui, “Candidate Park Geun-hye’s foreign and security policy: The spread of the Korean Peninsula Trust Pro-
cess and Trust Diplomacy,” HanbandoFocus ［The Korean Peninsula Focus］, Nov/Dec, 2012.
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Park’s the foreign and security policy. When President Park suggested the Korean Peninsula 
Trust Process for improving inter-Korean relations, she also announced her government’s ini-
tiative to promote trust among nations in East Asia, as well as a global diplomacy built on 
trust. President Park presented a plan to build trust and create new order in East Asia 
through a new diplomatic program, namely Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast 
Asia. Through this program, she intends to seek the institutionalization of peace and coopera-
tion in Northeast Asia by promoting security in non-traditional fields in which cooperation is 
easy, such as anti-terrorism, the environment, and disaster response.
Park’s “trust diplomacy” promotes multi-level diplomatic relations with the U.S., China, 
and Japan. In East Asia, instability has increased due to power transitions caused by the 
growing influence of China. In addition, U.S.-China competition and conflict are being aggra-
vated since the U.S. adopted its “pivot to Asia” and “rebalancing strategies” in order to con-
trol the expansion of China.15 To deal with North Korea’s nuclear development and security 
threats, cooperation and strategic coordination with the U.S. and China are critical to South 
Korea. The South Korean national security strategy is to expand the country’s strategic part-
nership with China, which is the largest trading partner and which has leverage on North 
Korean issues. Meanwhile, South Korea seeks to consolidate its relationship with the U.S., its 
traditional ally. The Park administration has proposed a goal of deepening the South Korea-U.
S. alliance and reinforcing cooperative partnership with China at the same time. The Park ad-
ministration recognizes that the national interest of South Korea can be guaranteed not by
choosing between the U.S. and China but by enhancing a multi-level diplomatic network in
which the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the South Korea-China relationship coexist. With an
aim of enhancing the South Korea-U.S. alliance as a hub for security and peace in the region,
the Park administration has expressed a desire to develop the South Korea-U.S. alliance into
a comprehensive strategic alliance with a global dimension and beyond a simple military rela-
tionship. At the same time, the Park administration has proposed a goal of promoting political
and security cooperation that corresponds to the deepened economic relationship between
South Korea and China.
The South Korea-Japan relationship will likely be strengthened under Park’s rule. To this 
end, her administration has expressed its desire to resolve historical and territorial issues with 
the combined power of the governments and civil societies of South Korea, China, and Ja-
pan. Furthermore, the Park administration has declared a plan to continue previous efforts 
aimed at deepening the mutual cooperation between South Korea and Japan.
The Park government clearly aims to expand its roles and responsibilities as a middle pow-
er in the international community. The Park government is willing to actively contribute to 
resolving global economic issues, reinforcing the UN Security Council members’ activities, 
promoting exemplary developmental cooperation that can be of practical help to developing 
countries, and continually expanding the scale of South Korea’s Official Development Assis-
tance （ODA）. In the specific field of economic diplomacy, the Park government has proposed 
a policy that leads to the integration of East Asia by promoting free trade agreements with 
15 Mark Manyin, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama administration’s rebalancing toward Asia,” CRS Report for Con-
gress, March 28, 2012.
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East Asian countries and even some new market countries. To do this, the government has 
presented a plan to carry forward the South Korea-China FTA and the South Korea-China-
Japan FTA, to actively participate in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
（RCEP）, and to enhance economic and resource cooperation with new countries including 
the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America.
4   Major Issues of the Park Geun-hye Administration’s East Asia Diplomacy
4.1   North Korea Policy
4.1.1   How to Establish a New Trust-Building Process
The core of the Park administration’s North Korea policy is the Korean Peninsula Trust 
Process, as has been explained in this paper. It is an initiative to construct a Korean peninsula 
economic community and to build a foundation for peaceful reunification through a variety of 
economic cooperation projects. However, these will be implemented only if trust between 
South and North Korea is accumulated and only if North Korea’s denuclearization progresses 
by fulfilling existing agreements and developing the communication channel between the two 
Koreas. Compared to the former Lee administration’s hard-line policies on North Korea poli-
cy, President Park’s policy base aims for an improvement of inter-Korean relations.16 Unlike 
the former Lee administration’s principle of reciprocity by which support for and cooperative 
exchange with North Korea was carried forward only as a reward for North Korea’s denucle-
arization, the Park government attempts to separately pursue denuclearization of and cooper-
ative exchange with North Korea.
In spite of the Park administration’s desire for improving inter-Korean relations, the Korean 
Peninsula Trust Process can be pushed ahead only when North Korea stops nuclear tests and 
provocation threats, and only when it agrees to the inter-Korean communication. Considering 
that the international community has put strong sanctions on North Korea, due to its third 
nuclear test in 2013, and that since Park’s election, North Korea has issued several provoca-
tive threats and launched cyber-attacks, the Park administration’s Korean Peninsula Trust 
Process is facing a large obstacle even before being implemented. In a situation in which the 
international community is imposing tough sanctions on North Korea, and North Korea is re-
sponding with more nuclear tests and provocative threats, it is difficult for the South Korean 
government to improve inter-Korean relations. How to shift from heightened conflict caused 
by sanctions on North Korea and tough responses to a phase of active and productive com-
munication, in which the trust process works, is a great dilemma that the Park administration 
is currently facing.17
16 Recently, the new Unification Minister, Ryu Gil-jae, suggested a flexible North Korea policy that makes the Korean 
Peninsula Trust Process actually works by promoting humanitarian aid to or economic exchange with North Korea, 
without imposing the condition of North Korea’s denuclearization.
17 Kim Yong-Ho, “Coevolution Strategy and Epistemic Community: New Approaches to Change in North Korea, 
South Korea’s Unification Diplomacy and New Order in Northeast Asia,” presented at the seminar on “the Future 
of the Korean Peninsula: Unification or Perpetual Division,” organized by Hansun Foundation and Heritage Founda-
tion. 
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4.1.2   How to Respond to North Korea’s Nuclear Threat
The international community has imposed strict restrictions on North Korea in response to 
its third nuclear test on February 12, 2013 in Poongsu-ri, Huamkyungbook-do. Ever since, in-
security on the Korean Peninsula has been growing. The destructive power of the third nucle-
ar test was 6-7kt, which was evaluated to be much stronger than the first and second ones. 
Thus it is clear that North Korea’s nuclear technology has improved. It is not known exactly 
how much nuclear weapon development has been achieved by North Korea, especially in 
terms of size and weight, but any further development surely will become a worrisome threat 
to South Korea and even to other nations if indeed North Korea’s development skill has al-
ready reached a level to mount nuclear weapons on delivery systems such as medium-range 
or even long-range missiles. Of additional and pressing note is whether enriched uranium was 
used in North Korea’s third nuclear test. Experts consistently state that uranium is a greater 
threat than plutonium. Since plutonium, which was used in previous nuclear tests, had to be 
extracted from nuclear power generation, the international community’s monitoring of North 
Korea’s nuclear capability was relatively easy. However, international surveillance has become 
difficult and mass production of nuclear weapons has become easier because uranium can be 
taken from North Korea’s own uranium mine and extracted in its centrifuge.18
North Korea’s third nuclear test confirmed that the international community’s pressure and 
deterrence has not been sufficient to stop North Korea’s nuclear ambition, and that North 
Korea has become an effective or nearly-effective nuclear power. South Korea is facing a dif-
ficult choice of whether to officially accept North Korea’s nuclear capability or to seek North 
Korea’s denuclearization through a new strategy. In addition, given North Korea’s possession 
of nuclear weapons and the difficulty of deterrence, South Korea is facing a difficult challenge 
to secure deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Thus, the South Korean govern-
ment should establish effective ways to deter North Korea and utilize the currently-available 
U.S. nuclear umbrella, including relocating U.S. tactical nuclear resources but excluding of the 
option of South Korea’s nuclear possession.
4.2   Major Issues in South Korea-U.S. Relations 
4.2.1    South Korea’s Dilemma Due to Pivot to Asia-Pacific Policy of the U.S. and U.S.-
China Confrontation
The second Obama administration announced its “pivot to Asia-Pacific” policy as part of 
its U.S. foreign policy, and the U.S. is expected to pursue an active Asia policy diplomatically, 
militarily, and economically.19 This active Asia policy of the U.S. is clearly presented in New 
Defense Strategic Guidance, published by the Obama administration in January 2012. Accord-
ing to the publication, under the judgment that the threat of terrorism has been reduced, the 
U.S. is shifting the emphasis of its defense strategy from the current warfare to future chal-
lenges, in other words, to military preparation against a potentially hostile country. In this 
18 “In Focus: North Korea’s Nuclear Threats, The New York Times, April 12, 2013. www.nytimes/interactive. 
19 Hilary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011.
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context, the U.S. considers China to be the biggest challenge it may face in the future.20 In 
addition, the U.S. is envisioning a strategy to increase its role in Asia by actively participating 
in multilateral consultative bodies such as the Asian Regional Forum （ARF） and the East 
Asia Summit （EAS）. Likely the U.S. presented its intention to prevent China’s regional hege-
mony by strengthening its cooperation with friendly and allied nations in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. Taking into account the importance of the Asia-Pacific region as a main export market 
and economic powerhouse, the Obama administration obviously attempts to maintain the 
economic status of the U.S. in the region. More specifically, the U.S. government has been 
promoting the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership （TPP）, almost certainly in order to check 
the ASEAN+3 led by China, the South Korea-China-Japan FTA, and the Asia-centric Region-
al Comprehensive Economic Partnership （RCEP）.21
The Chinese leadership is sensitively responding to America’s “pivot to Asia-Pacific” policy 
and its checks on China. Suggesting U.S.-China relations as a “new power relations,” the Xi 
Jin-ping government of China announced that future U.S.-China relations should be two pow-
erful nations’ relations based on cooperation. Since the “new power relations” suggested by 
the Xi government implies that China pursues an equal relationship with the U.S., and that 
China will not yield in a conflict, it is obvious that U.S.-China confrontation in East Asia will 
become even more intense.22
If the U.S.-China confrontation becomes fierce because of the pivot to Asia policy of the 
U.S., South Korea will be in a difficult situation in which it is forced to choose between its
relations with the U.S. and China. As the U.S.-China competition becomes more intense, the
U.S. may attempt to use South Korea to check China by seeking to strengthen the South Ko-
rea-U.S. alliance. Considering U.S. defense budget cuts and the restitution of wartime opera-
tional control of South Korea scheduled for December 2015, it is also expected that the U.S.
will request an expanded role for South Korea’s military, perhaps even a regional presence, if
the South Korea-U.S. alliance and U.S. military presence in South Korea is maintained at the
present level or a similar level. In particular, if North Korea refuses to give up its nuclear de-
velopment and continues its military threats on South Korea, South Korea’s dependence on
the U.S. will be increased in order to deter North Korean provocations, and then South Ko-
rea’s cooperation with China very likely will be constrained.23 In addition, if the U.S.-China
confrontation intensifies, getting the cooperation of China, which in recent history has had
the greatest leverage over North Korea, may become more difficult in the resolution of North
Korea issues.24
20 Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense,” January, 2012.
21 Im Kyung-soo,“Discussion of Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region and Implications,” KIEP Regional Eco-
nomic Focus, September, 10, 2012.
22 Lee Tae-hwan, “China’s foreign policy under Xi Jin-ping and the Korean Peninsula,” Jungsewajengchak [Situation 
and Policy], Sejong Institute, December 2012.
23 Specifically, the U.S. can ask for the use of South Korean military base to check China, expansion of the participa-
tion in the U.S. led-joint military training, participation in the East Asia Missile Defense （MD） system of the U.S., 
and the expansion of the South Korea-US-Japan military cooperation. 
24 Kim Yong-ho, “The Obama administration’s Korean Peninsula policy-Evaluation and prospects,” a paper presented 
at Korea International Political Science Association Conference, January 2013.
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4.2.2   North Korea Policy Coordination between South Korea and the U.S.
The resolution of North Korea’s nuclear development has been the top interest of South 
Korea and the U.S. since North Korea became recognized as a nuclear power through its 
third nuclear test. The South Korea-U.S. cooperation and the coordination of North Korea 
policy has become important in order to respond to North Korea’s new security threats. How-
ever, as was introduced in the previous section of this paper, there are some factors that can 
make the coordination of North Korea policy between the two countries difficult.
Specifically, dissonance may occur over the North Korea policy between South Korea and 
the U.S. While South Korea cannot give up the denuclearization of North Korea, the U.S. 
may admit North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons after North Korea’s third nuclear 
test and put a policy priority on nuclear nonproliferation. In particular, some South Korean 
experts are concerned that the U.S. may attempt to negotiate with North Korea in order to 
stop nuclear proliferation, excluding South Korea. However, recognizing South Korea’s con-
cern, the Obama administration recently stated that it will create a Korean peninsula policy 
focused on South Korea’s North Korea policy, and will not communicate with North Korea 
without South Korea’s participation or consent.25
4.2.3   Deepened South Korea-U.S. Alliance and Major Issues
The relationship between the first Obama administration and the former Lee administra-
tion has been evaluated as the best one that the two countries have forged since relations 
were first established. The two countries agreed to develop the South Korea-U.S. alliance into 
a comprehensive global strategic alliance beyond a simple military relationship. However, the 
specific timing and direction of planning have not been set. The second Obama administra-
tion has a goal of maintaining its influence in Asia through its “pivot to Asia-Pacific policy.” 
Yet the Obama administration is facing a dilemma since it needs to cut down on its defense 
budget to reduce its national deficit. Thus, the Obama administration may request an increase 
in the contribution and role of Korea, including costs to maintain the alliance.26
Currently, there are major policy issues for South Korea and the U.S. that are requiring at-
tention, such as preparation for the transition of wartime operational control in 2015; renego-
tiation of the U.S. Forces Korea defense cost sharing agreement, which expires in 2013; es-
tablishment of missile defense （MD） to cope with North Korea’s nuclear weapons and 
missiles; and negotiation on the revision of the South Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement. Notably, 
in the renegotiation on the U.S. Forces Korea defense costs sharing agreement, a fierce politi-
cal battle between South Korea and the U.S. is expected because the U.S. is likely to strongly 
request increased cost-sharing with South Korea.27
Due to the difference of opinion between South Korea and the U.S. on the amendment of 
the South Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement, which expires in March 2014, conflict between the 
25 “No US-North Korea Discussion without South Korea,” The Transition of the Korean Peninsula Policy, Korea Times, 
March 27, 2013.
26 Yoon Deok-min, “South Korea-US Alliance at a Turning Point: How to Build Strategic Alliances?” a working paper, 
Institute of Foreign Affairs and Security, September 27, 2012.
27 Won Gon Park, “A challenge for the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Defense Cost-Sharing System,” EAI Working Paper, July, 
2013.
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two countries is expected. The key issue in the amendment of the South Korea-U.S. nuclear 
agreement is whether the U.S. will admit South Korea’s rights to spent fuel reprocessing and 
uranium enrichment. The reason that South Korea is requesting this reprocessing right is be-
cause there is almost no space left to store spent fuel. South Korea also has been requesting 
the self-enrichment right because it spends massive amounts of money every year on over-
seas nuclear fuel enrichment despite the fact that South Korea is the world’s fifth largest nu-
clear power plant country, and because its power operation can be stopped if any disruption 
in fuel supply occurs. President Park declared during her election campaign that she would 
amend the “unreasonable” South Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement. However, the U.S. govern-
ment has maintained a negative stance about it because it is afraid that Korea may easily 
choose to develop nuclear weapons if the fuel reprocessing right of South Korea is allowed. 
Korean newspapers reported that the U.S. government is hoping that the South Korean gov-
ernment would permanently give up the rights to uranium enrichment and spent fuel repro-
cessing when revising the South Korea-US nuclear agreement.28 If this happens, the South 
Korean government, which is seeking to acquire the right to produce low-enriched uranium 
and the right to reprocess spent fuel for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, will encounter 
difficulties because it will be a step back from the current South Korea-U.S. nuclear agree-
ment.
4.3    Issues of South Korea-China Relations: Can China Cooperate with South Korea 
in inducing North Korea’s Denuclearization and Policy Change?
As China’s national power is rising rapidly and the economic interdependence between 
South Korea and China is being deepened, economic and social cooperation with China has 
become an essential task for the survival of South Korea. Recognizing this reality, the South 
Korean government has put efforts into developing a strategic partnership with China in all 
areas. In fact, South Korea-China cooperation has been remarkably enhanced as a result of 
recent economic, social, and cultural exchanges. As North Korea has increased its depen-
dence on China, South Korea’s cooperation with China is becoming more important for re-
solving North Korea nuclear issues, achieving peace on the Korean peninsula, responding to 
the sudden changes in North Korea, and achieving reunification.29
In recent history, South Korea-China relations have suffered because of the role of China 
in the nuclear development of North Korea and the transition of its leadership. In spite of 
warnings from the international community, North Korea has continued to develop nuclear 
weapons and missiles. When the international community, including the UN, imposed sanc-
tions on North Korea, China showed a lukewarm attitude and then took a North Korea-sided 
stance at the last minute. This has aggravated South Korea-China relations and China-U.S. 
relations. The Chinese government’s response to North Korea’s first and second nuclear tests, 
28 “U.S. Nuclear Agreement, Super Strong Action,” Chosun Daily newspaper, March 29, 2013.
29 Chang-hoon Cha, “China’s Korean Peninsula policy-responsible power and Xi’s North Korea policy dilemma,” a pa-
per presented at Korea International Political Science Association Conference, January 2013; Xiaohe Cheng, “From 
Jiang Zimin to Hu Jintao: The Evolution of China’s Policies toward the Korean Peninsula,” Korea Observer, Vol. 43. 
No. 4, 2012.
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as well as to North Korean attacks on the South Korean ship “Cheonan” and on South Korea’
s Yeonpyeong Island proved that China was not prepared to whole heartedly condemn North 
Korea or support South Korea, even though the international community largely did. While 
China has promoted a goal of North Korean denuclearization and a policy transition aimed at 
reforming and opening North Korea, its policy priority clearly has been on maintaining lever-
age over North Korea and preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime.
Without the active cooperation and participation of China, the effect of sanctions on North 
Korea would have to be limited. As for South Korea and the U.S., it is an essential task to 
persuade China to actively participate in tough sanctions of the international community on 
North Korea’s nuclear tests in order to deter North Korea’s nuclear development. In February 
2013, it was widely reported that negative public opinion on North Korea was spreading in 
China after North Korea’s third nuclear test, and that the Chinese government was actively 
participating in sanctions on North Korea, unlike in the past. Whether this recent behavior of 
China represents changes in China’s North Korea policy or simply temporary pressure on 
North Korea will have a significant impact on the process of resolving North Korea issues in 
the future.30
4.4    Issues of South Korea-Japan Relations: Conflicts Surrounding Territory and His-
tory, and the Conservative Shift in Japan
The recent conflict and confrontation surrounding territory and history in Northeast Asia is 
an important factor bringing instability to the regional order. The dispute between China and 
Japan over the sovereignty of Senkaku （Diaoyu） Island has been heated since 2010.31 As for 
South Korea-Japan relations, conflict over Dokdo, an island between Korea and Japan, be-
came intensified recently, and past historical issues like Japan’s enslavement of Korean wom-
en for sexual servitude—also known as the “comfort women” issue—is deterring the two 
countries’ advanced relationship.32
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, from the Liberal Democratic Party, succeeded in re-
placing the ruling regime by achieving an overwhelming victory over the ruling party, the 
Democratic Party, in the House of Representatives General Election in December, 2012. 
Since Abe promised conservative and nationalistic foreign policy during his election period, 
the international community and South Korea have become greatly concerned about his lead-
ership and ensuing changes in Japanese policies.33 During the election period, Prime Minister 
Abe expressed his desire to strengthen the security system of Japan through the revision of 
the Peace Constitution. In addition, he declared his will to transform the existing Self-De-
30 In this respect, the Park administration suggested three-party talks of South Korea, U.S. and China, to coordinate on 
and cooperate over North Korea policy as well as to seek the denuclearization North Korea and the transition of its 
political system. However, the Chinese government has not yet responded clearly.
31 KoichiroGenba, “Japan-China relations at a cross roads,” International Herald Tribune, November 21, 2012. 
32 Mori Kazuko, “Territorial Disputes and Historical Consciousness in Northeast Asia,” A paper presented for the 3rd 
East Asian Community Forum organized by the Center for Contemporary Korean Studies, Tokyo University, Sep-
tember 28, 2013. 
33 “Japan’s new cabinet: Back to the future,”The Economist, January 5, 2013; “Japanese foreign policy: Down-turn 
Abe,” The Economist, January 5, 2013.
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fense Forces in Japan to Defense Forces, and seek support, domestically and internationally, 
on Japan’s right to collective self-defense. In addition, he denied the Kono Discourse of 1993, 
which admitted the Imperial Japanese Army’s use of “comfort women,” which has resulted in 
the intense conflict between South Korea and Japan.34
Right after taking office, the Abe administration started pushing ahead radically new poli-
cies, such as cutting the currency exchange rate and stimulating Japan’s economy through 
significant government intervention. Clearly, Abe’s priority was economic recovery. In re-
sponse, the Japanese economy has been showing clear signs of recovery. Meanwhile, the Abe 
administration has begun actively promoting augmented defense capability and an enhanced 
alliance between the U.S. and Japan. The overall conservative shift in Japan, and in particu-
lar the nationalistic policies on territorial and past history issues, is likely to aggravate conflict 
and confrontation between South Korea and Japan as well as affect regional order in North-
east Asia. In particular, the visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso and 
other lawmakers in April sparked an outcry in South Korea and China. In addition, Abe’s re-
marks on wartime history have thrown cold water on efforts by South Korea to improve bi-
lateral ties. Abe questioned whether Tokyo’s World War II occupation of nations could be 
defined as aggression. The South Korean government and the public have responded to the 
Abe administration’s scandalous perception and remarks on wartime history with anger and 
harsh criticism.35
The Liberal Democratic Party is expected to take up a lot of seats in the upcoming Upper 
House Election in July, 2013, and there are concerns that the Abe administration would more 
actively promote nationalistic foreign policy, such as the proposed amendment of Japan’s 
Constitution and empowerment of its military, based on the strong domestic political support 
the Abe administration has had. South Korea and Japan should cooperate closely in order to 
deter North Korea’s nuclear development and to check the rise of China. Yet the Abe admin-
istration’s conservative shift and territorial conflicts have cooled the relationship between the 
two countries and make cooperation between South Korea and Japan more difficult.
5   Conclusion
Looking at the experiences of the former presidents who have been elected since democ-
ratization in South Korea, high approval ratings have been maintained at the beginning of a 
term of office, but the ratings steadily decreased in the second half of the term until the lead-
ers finally lost their leadership position and administration became a lame duck. This high 
expectation-disappointment cycle has been repeated without exception and has been exten-
sively studied by experts.36 The repeating situation, in which all presidents elected after 
34 Park Young-joon, “The Liberal Democratic Party Abe administration’s re-launch and the forecast of the Korean pen-
insula policy of Japan,” Korea International Political Science Association Conference, January 2013.
35 Lee Nae Young, “Abe’s remarks have thrown cold water on efforts by South Korea,” Asahi Shimbun Asia & Japan 
Watch, May 24, 2013. 
36 For an analysis of failure of South Korea’s former presidents, refer to Lee Sook-jong and Kang Won-taek. eds. 2013 
The Condition of President’s Success （East Asia Institute, 2013）.
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democratization left the Blue House in disgrace as failed presidents, was a personal misfor-
tune for each individual president, and shook the faith of the people who had chosen that 
president. Over time, South Koreans lost their confidence in the future of the country and 
politicians’ ability to lead. The reasons for the repeated failure of South Korean presidents are 
complex. One reason is the fatal limit of the single-term system for the presidency, which 
causes a dramatic weakening of support in the second half of a term; another is lack of insti-
tutional devices to check any excessive concentration of power; a third important reason is 
that South Korean presidents have invested a lot of effort to be elected, but begin their term 
without enough preparation and planning, leading to immediate problems, unprofessionalism, 
lack of the public’s trust, and failure.37
Can President Park finish her term as a successful president, unlike former presidents? 
The reality of South Korean politics is not so simple. The Park administration has been 
launched facing a serious crisis from the beginning, and has already encountered numerous 
difficulties such as appointing cabinet ministers and vice-ministers and conflict with the polit-
ical opposition. As a result, President Park’s approval rating fell to 41% in a poll conducted 
by Gallup Korea on March 26, one month after her inauguration.38 It was the lowest rating 
compared to former administrations. Externally, in addition, security threats have become a 
bigger concern, due to the possibility of North Korea’s further provocations and nuclear tests 
in response to international sanctions. In order to build a political base for a successful five-
year term, the Park administration will have to cope with the national and international crises 
wisely.
37 The political culture and practices of South Korea that highlight only the negative points of former presidents, with-
out consideration of their contributions and external circumstances, very likely exaggerate the failure of South Kore-
an presidents. 
38 Gallup Korea, “Weekly Approval Ratings of President’s Performance,” March 29, 2013.
